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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor to an incumbent 
manufacturer with entrants in both manufacturing and distribution sectors. It is well-known that a potential entry threat 
is welfare increasing under homogenous price competition, even though the potential entrant is less productive. This 
paper reexamines this intuition. We show that the entry threat of a less-productive manufacturer is welfare decreasing 
when there is an exclusive dealing contract between the incumbent manufacturer and distributor.
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     1 Introduction
The e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts have been a controversial subject among economists
for more than 20 years.1 In this paper, we will show that weak entrants have a crucial role
for understanding the e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts on social welfare. Those entrants
may become the main reason for the exclusive dealing contract to decrease social welfare.
In other words, we will present the possibility that an entry threat may create a harmful
mechanism for social welfare when there is an exclusive contract.
It is well-known that a potential entry threat is welfare increasing (more rigorously, not
welfare decreasing) under price competition with a homogenous product, even though the
potential entrant is weak (less productive). In this paper, however, we will show that this
result is not applicable when there is an exclusive dealing contract. An entrant can decrease
social welfare when incumbents sign exclusive dealing contracts. In order to consider this
point clearly, we focus on large and strong distributors who possess strong bargaining power
over manufacturers.2 How can we obtain such a counter-intuitive result? The exclusive
dealing contract o⁄ered by the incumbent distributor is a key element. As explored by
Aghion and Bolton (1987), an exclusive dealing contract functions not only as an entry-
deterrence device but also as a rent-extraction device by setting an appropriate level of
liquidated damage. Hence, in our model, without an entrant in the manufacturing sector,
an e¢ cient transaction (incumbent manufacturer trades with the entrant distributor) is
realized even under the exclusive dealing contract, and the incumbent distributor obtains
the liquidated damage. With the possibility of entry into the manufacturing sector, however,
this mechanism does not function properly. If the exact cost of the new manufacturer is
uncertain, the incumbent distributor cannot set an appropriate level of liquidated damage
to extract all rents realized by the e¢ cient players. Thus, there is a possibility that the
ine¢ cient entrant in the manufacturing sector replaces the e¢ cient incumbent and trades
with the new e¢ cient distributor. This trade decreases total welfare.
In recent times, Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) treated the cases of manufacturer-
distributor relationships in the context of exclusive dealing contracts.3 However, those papers
examined the exclusive dealing incentive of an incumbent manufacturer. In this paper, we
focus on the exclusive behaviors of an incumbent distributor. We explore a new aspect of
exclusive dealing contracts.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the basic model with one manu-
facturer. Section 3 provides the optimal contracts when an ine¢ cient entrant manufacturer
exists. Finally, Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
1Rey and Tirole (2007) provide a concise survey on this topic.
2The market power of the distribution sector on vertical restraints has recently become a growing concern.
The European Commission has revised the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation and the related
guidelines on supply and distribution agreements: a vertical agreement to bene￿t from the block exemption,
not only the supplier￿ s market share (as is currently the case) but also the buyer￿ s market share should not
exceed 30%.(European Commission Press Release, July 28, 2009) See also Miklos-Thal et al. (forthcoming)
for recent research on this topic.
3See also Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Wright (2009) for a model with homogenous products. Abito
and Wright (2008) develop a model with di⁄erentiated products in a similar context.
12 Basic Model
We consider a model with a simple vertical structure. Players are manufacturers (sellers),
distributors (buyers), and consumers. In this section, we analyze the case with one incumbent
manufacturer (IM) with constant marginal cost cI. In the next section, we introduce another
manufacturer which tries to enter the market. At the downstream, there is a incumbent
distributor (ID) with constant marginal cost dI and an entrant distributor (ED) with constant
marginal cost dE(< dI), that is, ED is more e¢ cient than ID.4 There is no entry cost, and
￿xed costs are zero for all players. In this setting, ID has an incentive to exclude ED
by using exclusive dealing contracts. In this paper, we consider exclusive dealing contacts
with liquidated damage.5 The contract is consisted with the compensation x and liquidated
damage h. The liquidated damage level h is the damage the signer must pay if he breaches
the contract and trades with the entrant distributor. We assume that if the incumbent
manufacturer is indi⁄erent between breaching and not breaching, it trades with the entrant
distributor. Any commitments on wholesale prices or distribution margins are not included
in the contract. Since there is no entry cost and no uncertainty about the entry, the di⁄erence
between the incumbent and the entrant distributor is the possibility of o⁄ering an exclusive
dealing contract. Only the incumbent distributor has an opportunity to o⁄er exclusive
dealing contracts.
All consumers have the same preference, and the reservation price for the product is
v. Each consumer buys at most only one unit of the product, and we set the number of
consumers as 1 for simplicity. In order to avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that
v is su¢ ciently high, and all possible transactions are pro￿table for consumers, that is,
v > dI + cI. We assume that all players are risk neutral. Under these assumptions, the
transaction between IM and ED is e¢ cient and socially optimal.
This game runs as follows. At t = 0, the incumbent distributor o⁄ers an exclusive dealing
contract to the incumbent manufacturer and the manufacturer decides whether to accept or
reject this contract.6 At t = 1, the entrant distributor decides to enter the market. Since we
assume no entry cost, an entrant surely enters if it can ￿nd the partner to deal with. At t=2,
each distributor o⁄ers a wholesale price to an upstream ￿rm in a "take-it-or-leave-it" man-
ner. We assume that distributors have strong bargaining power over manufacturers. This
assumption can be interpreted as a simpli￿ed model with multiple identical manufacturers.7
The manufacturer can accept both of the o⁄ers since we do not assume any capacity con-
straint for the manufacturer. Then, active distributors compete a la Bertrand in the retail
market. ID and ED simultaneously o⁄er their retail prices to consumers. P i is the retail
price o⁄ered by distributor i (= ID;ED). Finally, consumers determine whether to buy the
product.8
4In this sense, we can see that our model is an extension of Comanor and Rey￿ s (2000) model with
e¢ cient downstream entrants and weak upstream entrants. Comanor and Rey (2000), however, exclude the
possibility of trade between entrants, i.e., between EM and ED, by assumption.
5We have examined other types of exclusive contracts in two papers, Oki and Yanagawa (2009, 2010).
6We assume that if the manufacturer is indi⁄erent about whether to sign the exclusive contract, then it
signs it in order to avoid additional notation.
7Armstrong (2006) also assume that the platform (corresponding to distributors in our model) can o⁄er
wholesale prices to producers.
8We assume the following tie-break rules for simplicity. If two prices are the same, the more e¢ cient trans-
2Here we will show that there is no ine¢ ciency in this case even if an exclusive dealing
contract is agreed between the incumbents. Suppose that the incumbent manufacturer has
signed the exclusive contract with a liquidated damage level, h, at t=0. This implies that
the entrant distributor has to pay h additionally to buy from the incumbent manufacturer.
Hence, the wholesale price o⁄ers by the incumbent and entrant distributors at the equilibrium
becomes wID
IM = cI and wED
IM = cI +h, respectively where wi
IM is a wholesale price o⁄er from
distributor i (= ID;ED) to IM. Then, the minimum total cost of distributor i (denoted by
TCi) including a wholesale price and unit distribution cost becomes TCID = cI + dI, and
TCED = cI + h + dE.
Note that even if dI ￿ dE < h, i.e., TCID < TCED, the incumbent distributor will not
compete with the entrant at the retail market competition. If it competes, the equilibrium
retail price becomes P ￿ = TCED = cI + h + dE, and ID￿ s pro￿t (denoted by ￿ID) becomes
￿ID = h ￿ dI + dE < h. Hence, the incumbent distributor always avoids price competition
even if it has cost advantage and obtains the liquidated damage h by o⁄ering P ID > P ED. All
combinations such that P ID which is higher than P ED are Nash equilibria, but all equilibria
attain the same optimal liquidated damage level. Hence, throughout this paper, we simply
assume that a Nash equilibrium that maximizes the pro￿t of ED is chosen without loss of
generality. That is, the incumbent always o⁄ers P ID ￿ v. With signed exclusive dealing
contract and given h, the signer (IM) always breaches the contract and trades with the
entrant by paying h. Then the outcome with each players pro￿t (￿ID, ￿ED and ￿IM) at the
end of t=2 is as follows: ￿ID = h, ￿ED = v ￿ (cI + h + dE),and ￿IM = x.




s:t: 0 ￿ h ￿ v ￿ cI ￿ dE:
Let h￿ and x￿ denote the equilibrium level of liquidated damage and compensation, respec-
tively. Obviously, h￿ = v￿cI ￿dE. The compensation x￿ = 0 is su¢ cient for the incumbent
manufacturer to sign because it can obtain only zero even by rejecting the exclusive contract.
ID obtains all surplus by the liquidated damage. Each player￿ s payo⁄ becomes as follows:
￿ID = v ￿ cI ￿ dE, ￿ED = 0, and ￿IM = 0.
At the equilibrium, the e¢ cient entry occurs and there is no welfare loss. The liquidated
damage as a rent extraction device, h, enables the incumbent distributor to absorb the entire
surplus that the e¢ cient entrant brings to the market. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When no potential entrant exists in the manufacturing sector, the optimal
exclusive dealing contract with liquidated damage does not deter an e¢ cient entry, and there
is no welfare loss.
3 The Optimal Contract with an Entrant Manufacturer
In this section, we introduce another entrant; an entrant manufacturer (EM), that decides to
enter or not at t=1. Both the entrant and the incumbent manufacturer produce homogenous
action is chosen by consumers. If two transactions have the same e¢ ciency level, the entrants￿transaction
is chosen.
3goods. EM￿ s constant marginal cost, cE, is uncertain when an exclusive dealing contract is
o⁄ered. All players only know that cE is uniformly distributed in [cE;￿ cE]. Hereafter, we
will focus on an ine¢ cient upstream entrant case by assuming that EM￿ s cost is uniformly
distributed in [cI;￿ cE], and we de￿ne C ￿ ￿ cE ￿ cI:9 At t=1, all players can observe the
realization of cE, before the entry decision.10 In order to avoid unnecessary complications, we
assume that v is su¢ ciently high, and all possible transactions are pro￿table for consumers,
that is, v > dI + ￿ cE. We assume that all players are risk neutral. Under these assumptions,
the transaction between the incumbent manufacturer and the entrant distributor is e¢ cient
and socially optimal. Since we continue to assume that there is no entry costs for both
entrants, the di⁄erence between the incumbents and the entrants is the possibility of signing
an exclusive dealing contract. Only the incumbents have an opportunity to write exclusive
dealing contracts.
This game runs as follows. At t= 0, the incumbent distributor o⁄ers the incumbent
manufacturer an exclusive dealing contract and IM decides whether to accept or reject this
contract. At t = 1, The entrant manufacturer￿ s cost, cE, realizes. Then, EM and ED decide
to enter the markets. At t=2, competition occurs. Competition structures are the same as
in the previous section. There are four stages; First, each distributor o⁄ers manufacturers
wholesale prices, wi
j, i = ID or ED and j = IM or EM, simultaneously in the take-it-or-
leave-it manner. Second, active manufacturers determine whether to accept each o⁄er or
not. For the same reasons described in the previous section, a manufacturer can accept both
o⁄ers. Third, active distributors simultaneously o⁄er their retail price to consumers. Let P i
denote the retail price o⁄ered by distributor i (= ID or ED). Finally, consumers determine
whether to buy the product and choose a distributor that o⁄ers the lowest retail price.11 In
this setting, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When there is a potential weak entrant in the manufacturing sector, an
exclusive dealing contract o⁄ered by an incumbent distributor induces ine¢ ciency as follows.
Case (i) C=2 ￿ dI ￿ dE. When C=2 ￿ cE ￿ cI, there is no ine¢ ciency. When cE ￿ cI <
C=2, the e¢ cient incumbent manufacturer cannot supply the product.
Case (ii) C=2 > dI ￿ dE. When cE ￿ cI ￿ C ￿ (dI ￿ dE), there is no ine¢ ciency. When
dI ￿ dE < cE ￿ cI < C ￿ (dI ￿ dE), the e¢ cient entrant distributor is excluded. When
cE ￿ cI ￿ dI ￿ dE, the e¢ cient incumbent manufacturer cannot supply the product.
Proof. By the assumption of cE, cE ￿ cI is also uniformly distributed on [0;C] where
C ￿ ￿ cE ￿ cI. We consider the following two situations separately; (a) h ￿ dI ￿ dE and (b)
h ￿ dI ￿ dE.
(a) h ￿ dI ￿ dE. In this case, if h ￿ cE ￿ cI, TCED = cI + h + dE and TCID = cI + dI.
It is better for the incumbent distributor to set its price very high and obtain the penalty h
9We assume that an upstream entrant (EM) is ine¢ cient for simplicity. Even if we assume that EM can
be more e¢ cient than IM with some probabilities, the qualitative results of this paper are not a⁄ected.
10Here we assume that the realization of cE is observable at t=1, but we may be able to assume that cE
is private information which is unknown for other players throughout two periods. Even if we assume that
cE is private information, qualitative results of this paper are not a⁄ected and become more robust since
exclusive contracts become renegotiation-proof. See Yanagawa and Oki (2008) for further discussion.
11We assume that the same tie-break rule in the previous section is applied.
4avoiding price competition since
cI + h + dE ￿ (cI + dI) = h + (dE ￿ dI) < h:
On the other hand, if h > cE ￿ cI, TCED = cE + dE and TCID = cI + dI. Since cE + dE ￿
(cI + dI) ￿ cE ￿ cI ￿ h < 0, the incumbent cannot win the retail price competition and
has zero pro￿t. Thus, in Case (a), the incumbent distributor can get positive pro￿t h with
probability (C ￿ h)=C, which is the probability that h ￿ cE ￿ cI. The expected payo⁄ of






(b) h ￿ dI ￿ dE. If h ￿ cE ￿ cI, the incumbent distributor obtains h as in Case (a). If
h > cE ￿cI, the incumbent distributor has a chance to win the retail price competition. We
have TCED = cE +dE and TCID = cI +dI. When cE ￿cI ￿ dI ￿dE, then TCED ￿ TCID.
The incumbent distributor earns cE + dE ￿ cI￿ dI ￿ 0. When dI ￿ dE > cE ￿ cI, on the
other hand, the incumbent distributor cannot win the retail price competition and earns zero






(h ￿ dI + dE)2
2C
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2C if h ￿ dI ￿ dE:
We should note that the incumbent manufacturer accepts this optimal exclusive dealing o⁄er
because its pro￿t is zero whether it accepts or rejects the o⁄er.













(h ￿ dI + dE)2
2C
;
and we classify this problem into the following two cases: (i) C=2 ￿ dI ￿ dE, (ii) C=2 >
dI ￿ dE.
(i) If C=2 ￿ dI ￿dE, then C￿(dI ￿dE) ￿ dI ￿dE and (C￿h)h=C+(h￿dI +dE)2=2C is
maximized at dI ￿dE within the range of h ￿ dI ￿dE. Thus, the optimal liquidated damage
level is h = C=2(= argmax (C ￿ h)h=C). Hence, the entrant distributor trades with the
incumbent manufacturer and the incumbent manufacturer obtains h = C=2 and there is no
ine¢ ciency when C=2 ￿ cE ￿ cI. When C=2 > cE ￿ cI, however, the entrant distributor
chooses to trade with the entrant manufacturer and the incumbent manufacturer, that is
more e¢ cient than the entrant, cannot supply the product.
(ii) If C=2 > dI￿dE, (C￿h)h=C is maximized at dI￿dE within the range of h ￿ dI￿dE.




2C ). Hence, when cE ￿ cI ￿ C ￿ (dI ￿ dE), the entrant distributor trades with
the incumbent manufacturer and there is no welfare loss. When dI ￿ dE < cE ￿ cI <
C ￿ (dI ￿ dE)(= h), we have h + cI + dE > cE + dE > cI + dI and the entrant distributor
is excluded since h and cE are too high for the entrant distributor to win the retail price
competition. When cE ￿cI ￿ dI ￿dE(< C ￿(dI ￿dE) = h), we have cE +dE ￿ cI +dI and
cE + dE < h + cI + dE, then the entrant distributor minimizes its total cost by trading with
the entrant manufacturer, and it can win the retail price competition. Thus, the e¢ cient
incumbent manufacturer cannot supply the product.
This result implies that the exclusive dealing contract decreases social welfare. Although
IM-ED combination is the socially optimal, we have shown that there is a possibility that
the ine¢ cient vertical structure EM-ED or IM-ID wins the retail price competition.
An intuitive reason of this result is as follows. The incumbent distributor uses the
exclusive dealing contract to absorb the rent which the entrant distributor derives. If the
penalty level h can be set appropriately, the incumbent distributor does not hesitate to induce
the e¢ cient transaction since it is the best way to absorb the rent through the penalty as
much as possible. However, the appropriate level must be perfectly contingent upon the
realized cost level of the entrant manufacturer (cE). Because cE is uncertain, the incumbent
distributor cannot set the level appropriately. In order to maximize its expected pro￿t, the
penalty becomes too high and the ine¢ cient transactions will be realized.
4 Conclusion
From Proposition 1 and 2, we have an interesting implication. The entrant manufacturer
is crucial for the result that the exclusive dealing contract generates ine¢ ciency. Without
the entrant manufacturer, the incumbent distributor can set the level of liquidated damage
appropriately and can absorb the rent completely. Hence, even with the exclusive dealing
contract, it does not decrease total welfare in this simple setting. In other words, the
existence of the entrant in the manufacturing sector and the uncertainty about the cost level
of the entrant are crucial for the ine¢ ciency. Our result implies that an entry threat does
not increase the welfare automatically even though the competition is homogenous and there
is no entry cost. This point is quite in contrast with the results of the contestable markets
theory. We can state that the e⁄ect of entry threats on social welfare is more complex than
we expected when there are exclusive dealing contracts.
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